Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
-George Santayana, 1863-1952 DESPITE ALL THE software systems we have seen, both in IEEE Software's columns and through our professional experience, periodically, something happens in the world of software engineering that really takes us by surprise. The last time we were in this position was after the revelation of software "cheats," that is, algorithms deliberately introduced into a system with the specific purpose of misleading the general public and certification agencies on the nature of system emissions. 8 This time, we feel that we must comment on the equally startling revelations emerging about the interactions among software, management, and requirements in the sad case of the two Boeing 737 MAX crashes. We stress that we are in the early days of diagnosing what went wrong; the appropriate agencies will report in detail at some stage. However, there is understandably an enormous amount of discussion in the media as the general public gradually becomes aware, through IEEE Software column articles such as this, of just how much software is in commercial devices. We won't simply regurgitate other speculations but, rather, will compare some disturbing patterns in these two crashes with past incidents in avionics and in other areas where software is rife and is implicated in system failure. Perhaps most shocking is the fact that the Boeing 737 had a formidable record for safety in the 50 years since its first flight. Is software really capable of destabilizing such an enviable record?
The forensic process of understanding something as traumatic as an aircraft crash is both thorough and time consuming, and investigators will go to extraordinary lengths to determine the nature of the crash. At some stage, we will know precisely what went wrong. As software engineering professionals, however, we are more concerned with how the resulting engineering lessons from failed systems are integrated into the software profession.
H istorically, we have always considered safety-critical software to be necessarily deserving of both higher standards at all phases of development-from the extraction of its requirements, to its careful specification, to its implementation-and a testing regime that is as rigorous and exhaustive as possible given time and budget constraints. At the other end of the software-development spectrum, we have the rapid growth of methodologies intended to deliver something of value with as light a development footprint as possible to reduce costs, represented largely by agile technologies. We did not expect there to be indications that these two polar opposites of development are merging. It is hard, however, to deny that this is happening in the rush to provide increasing amounts of software, for example, in autonomous vehicles.
We have previously written that conventional software systems typically grow at 20% per annum, with safety-related systems somewhat slower at approximately 10%, 9 chain involving criticality, lead to life-threatening circumstances. For example, if a hospital information system fails to contact a patient for a follow-up cancer check, this can lead to a potential delay in life-preserving treatment. As we have said, it is early for us to comment on the Boeing 737 MAX incidents, but there is already some evidence that we have seen similar kinds of failure before, and similarity is an important clue in forensic engineering.
First of all, having a safety-critical software system relying on interpreting the input correctly from a single external sensor would be highly questionable at best, yet this appears to have been done with the Boeing 737 Max ma neuvering characteristics augmentation system (i.e., MCAS) system, 10 using a single angle-of-attack (AoA) vane that measures the plane's angle between the airflow and the wing. Single-sensor reliance in software has long been a documented problem in the pitot tube and air-speed indicator. Icing of pitot tubes followed by erratic behavior has been encountered before in aircraft incidents, to the extent that, after a number of occurrences in 2008 and 2009 and culminating in the June 2009 Airbus 330 crash in the Atlantic Ocean, Airbus issued three mandatory service bulletins requiring that all A330 and A340 aircraft be fitted with three pitot tubes, 2 thereby satisfying one of the most fundamental principles of resilient engineeringredundancy. This can be carried over into the internal design of the software itself. 7 Even modern fire alarms have redundancy, combining inputs from both visual and heat sensors to reduce the frequency of false alarms.
There are actually two AoA vanes on a Boeing 737 MAX, but it is reported that the software was designed to take a reading from only one of them. 10 Unfortunately, software engineers tend to not deal very well with absurd input values, and this has been a well-known source of error in software systems for decades. 17 Worse still, adding an additional AoA vane with software to warn the pilots if there was a disagreement was apparently an optional extra, requiring further payment. 10 We find it an unusual practice, to say the least, to have the customer pay extra to buy redundancy for a safety-critical system, a feature that has been considered good and, some would argue, indispensable practice in safety-critical software systems for 25 years. (See Travis 19 for insight into the Boeing 737 MAX incidents from a software engineer with extensive flying experience, and Mellor 12 for a comprehensive discussion of the contributory role of software in aircraft crashes.) Apparently, both of the crashed 737 MAX aircraft were delivered without this option, a decision that has now been reversed with the March update of the 737 MAX software. 16 Interpreting external inputs safely with software is a recurrent theme in safety-critical system failures, even with multiple sensors. This was a factor, for example, in the first Tesla fatality, where the software failed to distinguish a large white 18-wheel truck and trailer crossing the highway against a bright spring sky in May 2016. 14 There is another thread in the 737 MAX crashes that we would like to address. How does software in a safety-critical system convey both unequivocally and quickly to the operator why it is doing what it is doing? Justification of behavior to the operator is a sine qua non in a safety-critical system. We are accustomed to arguments about software being more reliable than human operators, but there are enough incidents involving unexpected software behavior to justify paying much more attention to the information flow between software and operator. In 1994, an Airbus A340 displayed a gnomic "Please Wait" message on its flight management system during an emergency landing at London's Heathrow airport. 1 In 1997, a test pilot described the operating manuals of the MD-11 as having been written "by creatures from another planet" 5 (and it is reported that the pilots of the ill-fated Lion Air 737 MAX were consulting the aircraft manuals shortly before the plane crashed 6 ). In the 1994 Nagoya Airbus crash, the pilots were fighting the takeoff/go-around (i.e., TOGA) software that they had inadvertently engaged-the plane was trying to go around while the pilots were trying How does software in a safety-critical system convey both unequivocally and quickly to the operator why it is doing what it is doing? to land. 3 If we currently find it so difficult to include the human operator in software-based decisions, what is the future of systems based on artificial intelligence (AI), where such justification is much more difficult to realize?
Apparently, a design consideration has been to prevent information overload in the cockpit. Indeed, "One senior Boeing official said the company had decided against disclosing details about the system that it felt would inundate the average pilot with too much information-and significantly more technical data-than he or she needed or could realistically digest." 16 Information overload is a known problem in our IT-dominated world. As we have learned, information overload is not about the amount of information but about its relevance. 13 The next statement from the same Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article is more shocking: American Airlines pilots did not experience the problems that Lion Air and Ethiopian Air experienced because "American paid for an additional cockpit warning light that would have alerted them to the problem, while Lion Air and most other airlines didn't." Why was this warning light an optional extra?
Going from information underload to information overload within seconds is also a known risk. 13 It is experienced, for example, in robotic surgery when a surgeon has to grab control from the robot in the case of complications. Conversion from robotic surgery to laparotomy (open surgery) occurs in about 9% of the operations. Some wrongly argue that training for surgical conversion can be minimized because it is expected to happen less and less often. This approach seems similar to the one Boeing took: "The company had promised Southwest Airlines Co., the plane's biggest customer, to keep pilot training to a minimum so the new jet could seamlessly slot into the carrier's fleet." 16 However, as the WSJ noted, "amid the chaos of an aircraft lurching into a steep dive with emergency warnings blaring, it is unrealistic to expect pilots to recognize what is happening and respond almost instantaneously." 16 Although surgeons should receive additional training for laparotomy, we must remember that a surgical team is typically available to respond to such a crisis; in other words, there is a fallback position, another essential feature of a safety-critical system. This is not always the case when an aircraft is in trouble, because an emergency team cannot be brought into the cockpit, and even connecting experts on the ground via an audio or data connection with the cockpit may not be possible.
Another vital link in the chain of safety-critical systems is their certification. In certification, an independent body with great experience in assessing such systems is tasked with assessing their safety or lack thereof. These bodies include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for aircraft registered in the United States and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency for those registered in Europe. The whole idea of independence is that it is free of the usual commercial pressures and timelines, so it can assess the system and documentation as presented and determine if it is sufficiently safe for its intended use. However, the FAA delegated some certification tasks for the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. 15 Finally, what do you do when a safety-critical software system is deemed unsafe or is involved in a fatal incident? The software must of course be patched. As software engineers, we are used to patches. Indeed, in the world of truly agile development, they are a never-ending part of not only the development cycle but also the active use cycle. Mobile phone apps are endlessly patching themselves, and the same is true for all commercially used systems, whether they be browsers, word processors, or whatever. Frequent patching like this is highly beneficial to both the user (who sees a more reliable and, perhaps, more secure product) and the developer because it allows them to overlap development with active use, giving quicker time to market. However, is it really appropriate for safety-critical systems, and, if so, and under what conditions? We probably don't know. Unlike normal softwarepatch delivery times, which might be measured even in hours, changing safety-critical software would normally require reengaging the certification cycle, particularly after a fatal accident. This is most decidedly not a quick fix.
In the case of the 737 MAX, however, an open letter from Boeing Chair Dennis Muilenberg promises, "Soon we'll release a software update and related pilot training for the 737 MAX that will address concerns discovered in the aftermath of the Lion Air Flight 610 accident." 4 No doubt, the fact that Boeing's 737 Max 8 and 9 fleet is grounded is concentrating their minds appropriately, but this seems unusually quick for avionics software. Isn't this at risk of breaking another golden rule of software engineering? Even in the Volkswagen emissions scandal, disabling the software "cheat" appears to have destabilized at least some automobiles, 11 just as we predicted. 8 Unintended side effects are inevitable when attempting to update complex software systems. This is a lesson we seem incapable of learning.
That said, on-the-fly fixing of potentially critical systems has already become a feature of autonomous software in motor vehicles, such as Tesla, where updates are delivered on a regular basis over the Internet. We do not know how updates to vehicle software are certified, by whom, and under what conditions, and we invite someone from the motor industry to tell us in one of these columns. When does a patch reduce the risk of reoccurrence of failure? How was it certified, or was this bypassed? Does rapid incremental patching make things better or worse? Will we, as users, be told these important details, or are we to be blinded by technology or, worst of all, told that all will be well and that AI will save us all? I t is very important for the software engineering community to appreciate how we are to live with the benefits and potential risks of incremental and increasingly frequent updating in safety-critical software systems, just as we have had to with commercial non-safety-related systems. Yes, we are wallowing in software, but blindly trusting a system to keep us safe is not the way forward. We invite anyone working at the coal face in such systems to tell us how they balance the polar extremes of quick response for commercial opportunity against the careful and hard-won lessons needed to build systems on which people's lives depend, and which we so easily seem to forget.
